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Bank Level and Country Level Determinants of Bank Capital Structure and Funding Sources 
 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the determinants of capital structure and funding sources of 347 large global banks 
between 1998 and 2012 from 57 countries around the world. We find that the capital structure of 
banks does not evolve only as a result of capital regulations, it is also affected by market forces. 
We find that bank capital structure corresponds to corporate finance theory and buffer view, and 
in particular, that market-to-book ratio, size and risk are positively related and that profitability is 
negatively related to bank leverage. Banks in countries with higher tax advantages, creditor 
rights, deposit insurance and bankruptcy codes have more leverage and those bound by common 
law have less leverage. Size and country level factors are important determinants of sources of 
financing.  
 
Keywords: Global banks, capital structure, crisis, deposit/non deposit financing, speed of 
adjustment.  
JEL: G21, G32. 
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1. Introduction 
 Almost all of the studies on capital structure exclude the banking industry (e.,g., Bessler 
et al., 2013; Fan et al. 2012) because capital adequacy regulation dictates their capital structure. 
Another important reason to exclude banks is that their balance sheets are very different from the 
other firms because of their typically very high leveraging and deposit taking.
1
 Whilst this may 
justify excluding banks from a study of non-bank industrial firms, it is reasonable to ask whether 
the theories relating to capital structure that hold for industrial firms also hold for banks.  This 
paper thus asks: what are the determinants of bank capital structure? We examine the bank level, 
regulatory and country level determinants of bank capital structure. Since banks are deposit 
taking institutions, we also examine the determinants of deposit and non-deposit financing. We 
use large banks, which are a particular focus of the current regulatory environment because of 
their importance domestically and internationally as systemically important financial institutions. 
The amount of bank capital is determined by bank capital requirements (Mishkin, 2000, 
p.227). This means that bank leverage should be determined by regulations and that there should 
be less variation in leverage across banks.
2
 Putting it differently, standard corporate finance 
theories should have little power in explaining the cross-sectional variation in leverage for banks. 
Figure 1 plots Tire 1 capital as a percentage of risk weighted assets. Interestingly, the Tier 1 
capital ratio shows considerable variation. This implies that bank leverage needs more 
investigation, as it seems that capital structure decisions are not only a result of capital 
regulation.    
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                          
 
2
 For example, Basel I regulatory regime proposes a uniform capital ratio (Gropp and Heider, 2010).   
3 
 
Barth et al. (2005), Berger et al. (2008) and Brewer et al. (2008) find that historically 
banks hold higher levels of capital than the regulatory minimum. This finding implies that banks 
hold capital buffers in excess of the regulatory minimum, asserting the role of market forces in 
determining the cushions banks tend to maintain over the minimum capital requirements. Figure 
1 also shows that banks hold a higher level of Tier 1 capital as than that prescribed by the Basel 
regulations.  
There is a large body of literature which investigates the determinants of capital structure 
within individual countries.
3
 Some papers examine capital structure choices across countries to 
link the cross-sectional variation in the institutional environment.
4
 Recently, Gropp and Heider 
(2010) have examined the determinants of bank capital structure using a sample of US and EU-
15 banks and they confirm that the market/corporate finance view of capital structure applies to 
banks. Our study is related to Gropp and Heider (2010), but our approach is different in three 
respects; first, we investigate the impact of tax, second, in addition to bank level variables, we 
also examine institutional and country level variables, and third, we test whether financial crisis 
shows any significant effect on the leverage of banks. 
In particular, the paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we examine 
whether bank capital structure evolves as a result of capital regulations or corporate finance and 
buffer views explain the capital structure of banks. We use an international sample of large banks 
from 57 countries to examine whether the bank-level characteristics like profitability, market-to-
book, size explains some of variations of the capital structure of banks. Our findings imply that 
capital structure of banks is not solely determined by the capital regulations, rather, corporate 
                                                          
3
 Frank and Goyal (2015), Campbell and Hamao (1995), and Gatward and Sharpe (1996) examine the US, Japan and 
Australia, respectively. 
4
 Cross-country studies include Bessler et al. (2013), Fan et al. (2012), De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008), Giannetti 
(2003), Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001), Claessens, Djankov, and Nenova (2001), and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1998, 1999). 
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finance theory / buffer view explain a significant portion of capital structure of banks across the 
globe.  
Second, what is the role of country level governance and institutional factors in 
determining the capital structure of banks? There are a few studies which have looked at the 
importance of country level governance and institutional factors in the capital structure of non-
financial firms across the globe (e.g., Bessler et al., 2013; Fan et al. 2012). We extend their 
evidence in the case of banks. Our findings are consistent with Bessler et al. (2013) and Fan et al. 
(2012) using a non-financial sample from a number of countries, in that country level 
governance variables are a very important determinant of capital structure. Consistent with the 
previous literature (Bessler et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2012; Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2008; Claessens, Djankov and Mody, 2001; and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997, 1998), we find that, in contrast to countries with a common law origin, those with 
bankruptcy and deposit insurance have higher book leverage. These findings relate to the 
importance of the legal system, the implementation of investor rights, and the resolution of 
financial distress.  
We also examine the country level governance and institutional determinants of non-
deposit and deposit financing. We find that these variables are even more important compared to 
bank level variables for the sources of financing. The standard corporate finance determinants 
have little or no explanatory power in determining the sources of banks’ capital structure when 
we control for country level characteristics, while the magnitude and significance of country 
level variables suggest that country effects are more important for the sources of financing of 
banks.
5
   
                                                          
5
 To give an idea of the importance of country level governance and institutional variables, we compare our results 
with and without these variables. When we run our models without the variables we obtain an R
2 
of 31.7% to 37.0%. 
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Third, the tax treatment of interest and dividend payments is found to be an important 
factor which affects the leverage of firms after the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
and Miller (1977). However, no studies try to understand whether bank leverage responds to the 
Miller tax ratio in a similar way to non-financial firms. In this paper we hand collect the data on 
tax rates for different countries and relate it to the leverage of banks. We compute the Miller 
(1977) tax ratio and show that it is positively related to the leverage. This is in line with Fan et al. 
(2012), who show that for non-financial firms the coefficient of the Miller tax ratio is positive. A 
country’s tax system is of primary importance in explaining the capital structure of banks. We 
use the Miller tax ratios to explain the capital structure of banks in a cross country setting. We 
also classify our countries into classical, partial, and full dividend imputation systems. Our 
results support that banks located in the classical tax system have higher leverage. Interestingly, 
we show that creditor rights and bankruptcy codes are positive in the classical tax system 
suggesting that, in strong protection countries, the benefit of tax is more pronounced for credit 
suppliers.     
Fourth, banks are heavily regulated and capital regulation is at the heart of this. The 
recent financial crisis showed some fundamental flaws in capital regulation and that it cannot 
prevent banks from bankruptcy. Many of the banks that were rescued appeared to be holding 
regulatory capital, and in addition were also holding some buffer. We examine in this paper 
whether financial crisis shows any significant effect on the leverage of banks. We find that 
financial crisis is related to higher use of leverage by banks. This perhaps stresses the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
When we include the country level governance and institutional variables, R
2 
increases to 63.7%-69.0%. These 
results indicate the scale of the importance of these variables in explaining the sources of finance. The corruption 
index and bankruptcy code are negatively related to non-deposit financing, while deposit insurance and crisis are 
positively related. All these variables have an opposite relation (in sign) to the deposit financing.   
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equity capital was harder to raise during the financial crisis. Therefore, banks had to rely on the 
easier option to raise finance, leverage. 
Fifth, previous studies have not included regulatory capital (Tier 1) in estimating the 
speed of adjustment for bank capital structure. We include this when estimating the speed of 
adjustment, finding that it decreases as a result of the holding of regulatory capital. In particular, 
the speed of adjustment decreases by 6.1%, from 53.7% to 46.7%. This suggests that holding 
regulatory capital decreases the speed of adjustment to a certain degree. Thus, it is very 
important to consider regulatory capital when estimating the speed of adjustment for the capital 
structure of banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we develop the 
hypotheses and section three describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. In section four 
we describe the methodology; section five discusses the empirical results; and section six 
concludes the paper.  
2. Bank- and Country-level Determinants of Capital Structure  
2.1 Predictions from Buffer and Corporate Finance View  
Banks are required to hold capital buffers above the regulatory minimum to avoid the cost of 
issuing equity at short notice (e.g., Ayuso et al., 2004 and Peura and Keppo, 2006). Hence, it is 
expected that banks which face a higher cost of issuing equity at short notice are less levered 
because they keep buffers, which supports the buffer view (Gropp and Heider, 2010). 
Accordingly, in the buffer view, banks with higher market-to-book ratios, profits, and dividends 
are less likely to face a higher cost of issuing equity because of their better reputation, greater 
financial slack, and better market price (Gropp and Heider, 2010); hence, it is expected that these 
banks will have more leverage. 
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In the buffer view, the effect of size is not clear (see Gropp and Heider, 2010). Larger banks 
are expected to be less levered as they are more likely to issue equity at lower costs due to their 
reputation. Alternatively, larger banks may hold larger buffers because they are more complex 
and hence are subject to a higher asymmetric information problem. The relationship between risk 
and leverage is expected to be negative, as risky banks are more likely to have a higher cost of 
issuing equity and thus are expected to be less levered. Unlike Gropp and Heider (2010), who 
suggest that the buffer view has no clear prediction of the relationship between collateral and 
leverage, we argue that banks with higher collateral are likely to have more leverage, as they are 
expected to have greater financial slack and are less risky or obtain a better price, and thus face a 
lower cost of issuing equity at short notice. 
Alternatively, corporate finance theories which are developed from Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1985) propositions determine firms’ capital structure. Previous empirical studies (e.g., Rajan 
and Zigales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Fan et al. 2012), have converged the most reliable 
factors that explain firms’ leverage. They mainly show that leverage is positively associated with 
size and collateral while it is negatively related to risk, market-to-book ratios, dividends, and 
profits. The corporate finance literature argues that larger firms with more collateral face lower 
expected financial costs, and hence have higher leverage. Similarly, risky firms with higher costs 
of financial distress should use less debt. In addition, high-growth banks (measured by the 
market-to-book ratio) use less debt financing to mitigate the agency conflict in the form of 
underinvestment problems. Finally, previous corporate finance studies have relatively converged 
that profitable firms tend to be less levered as they have sufficient internal funds needing less 
external financing.
6
 Gropp and Heider (2010) test the related factors for explaining banks’ capital 
                                                          
6
 See Rajan and Zingales (1995) Frank and Goyal (2008 and 2009). 
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structure. Consistent with the empirical corporate finance literature, Gropp and Heider (2010) 
show that, for banks, leverage is negatively correlated with market-to-book ratios, dividends, 
profits, risk, and, is positively related to size and collateral.  
If corporate finance or buffer view explains the variation in capital structure of banks, we 
expect them to be significant in the regressions and the predicted effects of the explanatory 
variables on banks’ leverage for both the corporate finance and the buffer views are summarized 
in the following Table.
7
 As the table shows the signs for M/B, ROAA, size, and dividends are 
different significantly between the buffer view and corporate finance view.   
  
  
Buffer View Corporate Finance 
 
M/B + - 
ROAA + - 
Log (size) -/+ + 
Dividends + - 
Risk - - 
Collateral  + + 
2.2 Country Level Governance and Institutions  
We follow the empirical corporate finance literature to include country level variables, which 
are likely to influence bank leverage.  
2.2.1 Legal Systems 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that a country’s legal system can affect the agency conflict 
between corporate insiders and external investors. They suggest that the substance of the law and 
timely enforcement mitigate agency conflicts. They also show that developed countries and the 
common-law system offer better protection for outsiders. Following Fan et al. (2012) and Bessler 
                                                          
7
 See Gropp and Heider (2010). 
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et al. (2013), we therefore expect that banks located in developed or common law countries will 
use more equity and hence have lower leverage.  
In addition, corruption is suggested to shape a country’s legal system (e.g., Djankov et al., 
2003). Fan et al. (2012) argue that the perceived corruption level in a country reflects the 
integrity and enforceability of the law. Following Fan et al. (2012), we focus on corruption as the 
abuse of public office for private gain, measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
which measures the level of corruption perceived to exist among public officers and politicians. 
We reverse the index, so the CPI index determines a value from 0 to 10. The higher the index 
score, the higher the level of corruption. Fan et al. (2012) argue that debt is used more when the 
corruption is higher in public sector and hence we expect that banks in more corrupt countries 
have higher leverage.   
We also investigate the enforcement of debt contracts. Djankov et al. (2008) show that the 
legal structure which identifies the resolution of default is different across countries. In countries 
with weak enforcement codes or no bankruptcy codes, creditors have problems in retrieving the 
collateral of distressed firms or in seizing them (e.g., Claessens et al., 2001; Claessens and 
Klapper, 2005). In line with the corporate finance literature, the existence of a transparent 
bankruptcy code for deferred debt payments and firm reorganization encourages firms to issue 
more debt, especially long-term debt. Therefore, we expect that banks will have lower leverage 
in countries with a lack of explicit bankruptcy codes. We follow Djankov et al. (2008) and use a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for countries in which insolvent firms are most likely to undergo 
reorganization proceedings, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we expect that better protection of 
creditors will have a positive impact on bank leverage, as creditors are more willing to provide 
10 
 
debts. Following Djankov et al. (2007), we use the creditor right index. The higher the index 
score, the higher the level of creditor protection. 
2.2.2 Tax Systems 
Tax is one of the factors which have been recognized to be important in firms’ capital 
structure since the irrelevance propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Accordingly, we 
expect that tax possibly determines banks’ capital structure if they optimize their capital structure 
like non-financial firms. We employ the Miller tax ratio (1977), using the tax gain from leverage, 
to control for a country’s tax system. Following Fan et al. (2012), we calculate the Miller tax 
ratio for each country and year, taking into account corporate income tax and personal income 
tax on interest and equity. The tax gain from leverage is calculated as 1 - [(after tax value of 
dividends)/ (after tax value of interest)], using statutory tax rates. The tax gain from leverage can 
be positive or negative. Countries located in a dividend tax relief system, where divided 
payments are taxed at a reduced rate at the personal level, have negative values for tax gain. The 
tax gain from leverage is zero under a full dividend imputation tax system, in which shareholders 
pay taxes on the personal level of distributed income, but receive full tax credit for the corporate 
taxes paid on this distributed income. In the classical tax system, in which shareholders pay 
personal taxes on distributed income in addition to the corporate taxes paid on this income, the 
tax gain from leverage is positive. We expect that banks located in countries with such a tax 
system, where the tax gain from leverage is positive, use more debt. 
2.2.3 Country Factors 
We also control for bond and equity market development. De Jong et al. (2008) argue that in 
the developed bond market firms have more leverage, as they have more options for borrowing, 
and lenders are more willing to provide debt, while in the developed stock market, firms have 
11 
 
lower leverage, as they face lower costs of issuing equity. Therefore, we expect that banks will 
have higher leverage if they are located in countries with bond market development (measured 
by public bonds over GDP). In contrast, with the development of the stock market (measured by 
the logarithm of a country’s number of listed companies), banks face lower costs of issuing 
equity; we therefore expect that banks will be induced to reduce their leverage.  
Moreover, deposit insurance is in use in many countries to protect depositors, which reduces 
the risk of bank runs. We expect that banks located in countries with deposit insurance will have 
higher leverage, as they are less risky. For this purpose, we follow Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005) 
and use a dummy variable equal to one if bank deposits are at least partially explicitly insured by 
the government, and 0 otherwise. To proxy for the supply of funds to banks, we use the 
logarithm of domestic savings for each country We expect that banks located in countries with 
large domestic savings need less external financing, and hence have lower leverage.   
Finally, we control for other macroeconomic conditions including crisis, inflation, and GDP 
growth (e.g., Fan et al., 2012; De Jong et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).  We 
control for crisis by a dummy equal to 1 if the time is between 2007 and 2010; zero otherwise. 
Inflation is measured as an annual percentage change in the average consumer price index. GDP 
growth is the annual percentage change of gross domestic products. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We collected data for the largest 350 banks from Bankscope. As we required stock price and 
dividend data from DataStream, we could not identify three banks in other databases. Our final 
12 
 
sample therefore included 347 global banks, for which we had accounting, share price and other 
data. All the systematically important banks (29) are included in the sample.
8
 
The primary source of our bank-level data is Bankscope, which we used to obtain data on 
banks’ consolidated balance sheets and income statements. The country level data was collected 
from five sources: Economic and Social Data Service, International Financial Statistics, World 
Development Indicators, World Bank and Financial Development and Structure Dataset. The 
information about taxes was obtained from the OECD tax database, Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
Doing Business, and Ernst Young. We follow Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005), Djankov et al. 
(2008), and Djankov et al. (2007) to collect data on deposit insurance, bankruptcy code, and 
creditor rights, respectively.
9
 Table 1 shows the number of banks and bank-year observations 
across countries in our sample.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. We compare our descriptive statistics to those of 
Gropp and Heider (2010) for a sample of large banks, and Fan et al. (2012) for a sample of listed 
non-financial companies across 39 countries. For our bank sample, the market-to-book ratio is 
close to one, which is similar to Gropp and Heider (2010). The results show that banks hold less 
tangible assets than non-financial companies, as banks’ tangibility of assets are 1% versus 33% 
of book assets for non-financial firms (Fan et al., 2012).  
The results for other variables are relatively consistent with Gropp and Heider (2010) for a 
typical sample of banks across 16 countries. Mean (median) total assets are $17.50 ($17.21) 
                                                          
8
The list of Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) includes 17 European, 8 US, 3 Japanese, and 1 
Chinese bank. The Bank of America, Bank of China, Bank of New York Mellon, Banque Populaire CE, Barclays, BNP Paribas, 
Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Dexia, Goldman Sachs, Crédit Agricole, HSBC, ING Bank, JP Morgan 
Chase, Lloyds Banking Group, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, Mizuho FG, Morgan Stanley, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, 
Société Générale, State Street, Sumitomo Mitsui, UBS, Unicredit Group, and Wells Fargo are those listed.  
9 See Appendix 1 for details on data sources and definitions.  
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billion. Collateral, measured by liquid securities over total assets, is about 30% of assets. Table 1 
also shows that nearly 93% of banks pay dividends. The mean (median) profitability of banks is 
0.00 (0.01). Banks’ mean (median) book leverage is 0.77 (0.82) and mean (median) market 
leverage is about 0.84 (0.91). However, non-financial companies have lower debt ratios, as mean 
(median) book leverage for non-financial companies in Fan et al. (2012) is 0.29 (0.22). Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) also find relatively similar mean (median) 
leverage.
 
 Figures 2 and 3 present the book and market median leverage by country for the period from 
1998 to 2012, respectively. As can be seen in both figures, the highest five book leverage ratios 
are observed in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom, while 
Norway, France, Austria and Portugal have the highest market leverage ratios. Portugal is also 
among the countries with the highest leverage for non-financial companies, as reported by Fan et 
al. (2012). Indonesia has the second highest median leverage for non-financial companies in Fan 
et al. (2012), while its median leverage for banks is displayed in the last 7 countries with the 
lowest median leverage.  
Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics of all the variables. Deposit insurance, bankruptcy 
code, creditor rights, corruption index, and developed and common law are constant across time, 
while all remaining variables show time-series variation. All variables are defined in Appendix 
1, along with their sources.  
[Insert Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3 here] 
We compute pairwise correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables in 
Table 3. The overall results suggest that market-to-book ratio and size are positively related to 
both book and market leverage, while profitability, measured by ROAA, is negatively related to 
14 
 
leverage. For country level variables, the results show that banks in more developed economies, 
with explicit bankruptcy codes and stronger creditor rights, have higher leverage. Common law 
systems and low levels of corruption are associated with lower leverage. GPD growth rates and 
inflation are negatively related to leverage. Moreover, banks in countries with larger domestic 
savings and developed bond and stock markets tend to have higher leverage. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4. Methodology 
We use the following equation to test the corporate finance vs buffer view of capital structure:  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = {
𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 log(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝜃 Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1 +
𝐶𝑗 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
…….. (1) 
 
The dependent variable is market leverage. We use book leverage as an alternative measure of 
debt. The explanatory variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B), return on average assets 
(ROAA), the log of total assets (Size), collateral (Collateral) and a dummy for dividend paying 
banks (Div), for bank i in country j in year t (see Appendix 1 for a definition of the variables). 
All these variables are lagged by one year, except the dividend dummy. Time (ct) and country 
(cj) fixed effects are included in the regression to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
country level and across time, which might be correlated with the independent variables. 
Following Petersen (2009), we employ cluster adjusted standard errors at the bank level to 
account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors. 
We define book leverage as one minus the ratio of book value of the equity-to-book value 
of assets. We define market leverage as one minus the ratio of the market value of equity to the 
market value of the bank. Both of the dependent variables include both debt and non-debt 
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liabilities, such as deposits. We use leverage instead of debt, following Gropp and Heider (2010). 
The logic for using leverage rather than debt is that leverage is better defined than debt (see 
Welch, 2011). Leverage magnifies the sensitivity of equity to the underlying performance of the 
firm, especially for a bank. Debt and non-debt liabilities (both parts of leverage) are not 
explicitly differentiated in the corporate finance literature. However, there are a few exceptions, 
which include the theoretical contribution by Diamond (1993), and the empirical work by 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Rauh and Sufi (2010). As argued in Gropp and Heider (2010), 
since by construction leverage includes everything except equity, it can be readily linked to the 
regulatory view of banks’ capital structure. Nonetheless, as deposit accepting institutions, there 
are differences in banks’ capital structure and non-banks’ capital structure. We therefore 
examine two major components of the sources of financing:  deposit and non-deposit liabilities. 
To decompose banks’ leverage we use the following equation: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  {
𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 log(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝜃 Collateral𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑗.𝑡
+𝐶𝑗 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
……. (2) 
 
The dependent variable is either deposits (as a ratio of the market or book value of assets) 
or one minus deposits (as a ratio of the market or book value of assets). The explanatory 
variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B), return on average assets (ROAA), the log of total 
assets (Size), collateral (Collateral) and a dummy for dividend paying banks (Div), for bank i in 
country j in year t (see Appendix 1 for a definition of the variables). All these variables are 
lagged by one year, except the dividend dummy. Time (ct) and country (cj) are fixed effects and 
are included in the regression to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and 
across time that might be correlated with the independent variables. Following Petersen (2009), 
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we employ cluster adjusted standard errors at the bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation of errors. 
5. Regression Results  
5.1 Baseline Results: Buffer View vs Corporate Finance View 
We follow Gropp and Heider (2010) and test the determinants of banks’ leverage for our 
sample. It is worth mentioning that if capital requirements are a first-order determinant of banks’ 
capital structure, the standard corporate finance determinants should have little or no explanatory 
power in determining banks’ capital structure. We report the results of estimating Equation (1) in 
Table 4.  
Table 4 shows the results for a sample of firms that are comparable in size with the banks in 
Gropp and Heider’s (2010) sample. We report the results for both book and market leverage 
ratios to check whether the results are the same or different, as in Gropp and Heider (2010). We 
also report the coefficient elasticities and standard errors, which are adjusted for clustering at the 
bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 2009). 
All coefficients are statistically significant, except collateral, which is insignificant for the 
book leverage ratio, and dividends, which are not significant for market leverage. Unlike Gropp 
and Heider (2010), we find that the market-to-book ratio is positively and significantly 
associated with both market and book leverage ratios. However, our results are in line with a 
large cross-country study of non-financial firms by Bartram (2016), who shows that the market-
to-book ratio is positively related to leverage.
10
 Our results are in line with the buffer view that 
banks facing a higher cost of issuing equity should be less levered, as these banks need to hold 
capital buffers above the regulatory minimum to avoid the cost of issuing equity at short notice 
                                                          
10
 While our sample consists of 57 countries over the years 1998-2012, Bartram’s (2016) final sample consists of companies from 
50 countries during the period 2002–2009. 
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(Ayuso et al., 2004; Perura and Keppo, 2006). The cost of issuing equity is subject to asymmetric 
information. Banks with higher market-to-book ratios are either better known to outsiders and 
the market, have more financial slack, or can obtain a better price. Therefore, banks with higher 
market-to-book ratios can be expected to have lower costs of issuing equity, resulting in them 
having higher leverage ratios (Gropp and Heider, 2010).  
Although our results are not in line with the most previous studies for non-financial firms 
(e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2008, 2009; Fan et al., 2012) using agency 
conflict in the form of the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977), in that leverage is negatively 
related to the market-to-book ratio, we argue that banks with more growth opportunities use 
more debt to finance their growth options. Therefore, we propose that bank with high market-to 
book ratios may either, in line with the buffer view, hold discretionary capital to reduce the cost 
of issuing equity at short notice, or, within the corporate finance view, leverage use more debt.   
The remaining variables have the same sign as shown in Gropp and Heider (2010), using the 
largest bank sample, and, as in the regressions of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal 
(2009) and Fan et al. (2012), for firms’ leverage. Consistently, we find that leverage ratios are 
positively related to size, measured by the logarithm of total assets, while they are negatively 
associated with profitability, measured by ROAA, supporting the corporate finance. Our results 
are consistent with Frank and Goyal (2015), Bartram (2016) and Eun and Wang (2016), who find 
a negative relationship between leverage and profitability. Our results, therefore, suggest that a 
pure regulatory view does not apply to banks’ capital structure; rather, that corporate finance 
theory holds.  
We also find that the elasticity of banks’ leverage to all explanatory variables is relatively 
larger than the corresponding elasticity reported in Gropp and Heider (2010). For example, the 
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elasticity of market (book) leverage to profitability, measured by ROAA, is -0.053 for our 
sample, compared to that of -0.018 in Gropp and Heider (2010). The overall results suggest that 
banks’ capital structure is not only affected by the regulatory view, but also by the standard 
corporate finance view. Consistent with the corporate finance view, leverage decreases with 
profitability, suggesting that banks with greater internal funds are less likely to tap into the 
external capital market, and hence have lower leverage. The coefficients of size suggests that 
larger banks are more diversified, face lower costs of financial distress, and hence have higher 
leverage. Our results are relatively consistent with those of Brewer III et al. (2008), who find that 
size is negatively related to banks’ equity ratios. However, they do not find strong evidence to 
support the impact of profitability on these ratios. Dividends are in line with the buffer view, but 
only for the book leverage ratio, which is more important for banks, since capital regulation is 
imposed on book, but not on market values (Gropp and Heider, 2010).  
We also check the robustness of our results by including country and/or time fixed effects as 
well as risk.
11
 The results are reported in Appendix 2 for space considerations.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                          
11
 We include either or both country and time fixed effects in regressions in Appendix 2. Models (1) and (5) do not 
control for time and country fixed effects for market and book leverage ratios, respectively. Models (2) and (6) 
control only for country fixed effects, while estimations (3) and (7) control only for time fixed effects using book 
and market leverage ratios as our dependent variables. Models (4) and (8) include both time and country fixed 
effects. The R
2 
drops from 0.66 (Model 4) to 0.39 (Model 1) in market leverage. As crisis affects different countries 
in a different way, this effect is evident in R
2
 when the country and time fixed effect is not included. However, R
2 
remains relatively stable at 0.88 (Model 8) to 0.84 in book leverage when time and country fixed effects are 
excluded from Model 5. These results suggest that country or time fixed effects do not drive the fit of our 
regressions in book leverage regressions significantly, as R
2
 is relatively similar across regressions for book 
leverage. Following Lemmon et al. (2008) and Booth et al. (2001), we include risk. For book leverage, the 
coefficients on risk are not statistically and economically significant across the different Models (5-8). For market 
leverage, risk is statistically significant in Models 1 to 3, but is no longer significant when both time and country 
fixed effects are included (Models 2 and 4). The insignificant coefficient of risk on book leverage and its positive 
impact on market leverage is not in line with standard corporate finance arguments, nor with empirical studies on 
firms’ leverage (e.g., Lemmon et al., 2008; Welch, 2004). Gropp and Heider (2010) also find that risk significantly 
reduces banks’ leverage, which is not consistent with our results shown in Table 5. The remaining coefficients are 
relatively similar, in particular Model (4), which includes both time and country fixed effects, to those reported in 
Table 4, where risk is omitted. Therefore, the results suggest that risk does not drive out the other variables. 
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 5.2 Country Effects 
As we propose that legal systems and country factors do affect banks’ capital structure, we 
estimate the influence of country level explanatory variables in Table 5. Table 5 presents the 
results of both market (Models 1 and 2) and book (Models 3 and 4) leverage. The models fit the 
data very well, as the R
2
 for banks is higher than non-financial firms in Fan et al. (2012), who 
investigate both the firm and country level variables on leverage. For market leverage, the R
2
 is 
about 0.58, compared to 0.07 in Fan et al. (2012, Table 6), and, for book leverage, the R
2
 is about 
0.87, compared to 0.18 in Fan et al. (2012, Table 4). 
The top half of Table 6 shows the coefficients of our bank-specific variables. The overall 
results suggest that the coefficients for the bank specific variables have the same sign in the 
regressions where country level variables are included, and are also generally consistent with 
individual leverage regressions without the country level variables, as shown in Tables 4 and 
Appendix 2. In Table 5, we also control for the effect of regulation by including regulatory Tier 
1 capital (Tier one) as an additional independent variable. The estimated coefficients on Tier 1 
capital are significantly and negatively related to leverage at both market and book values. The 
results suggest that capital requirements are of first order importance in determining the capital 
structure of banks. 
The lower half of Table 5 shows the coefficients for country level variables. In contrast to 
Fan et al. (2012), we do not find evidence that economic development and the corruption index 
affect banks’ leverage significantly. However, similar to Fan et al. (2012), we find that leverage 
is unrelated to inflation. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that banks’ leverage at both 
market and book values is higher in countries with an explicit bankruptcy code (Models 1 and 2) 
and lower in common law systems (Models 1, 3, and 4). We also find that banks have higher 
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leverage during the crisis, as the dummy variable for the financial crisis (crisis) is positive and 
relatively consistent across models.  
Since, in line with Gropp and Heider (2010), our results support the argument that banks may 
choose their capital structure like non-financial firms and hence standard determinants of firms’ 
leverage can also drive banks’ capital structure; we investigate the impact of tax on banks’ 
leverage. Within corporate finance theory, leverage increases with the tax benefits of debt. 
Therefore, the high leverage of banks may suggest higher tax benefits of debt. Our results show 
that banks’ leverage is higher in countries where the tax gain of leverage, measured by the Miller 
tax ratio, is positive. This evidence is in line with Fan et al. (2012), who find a significant and 
positive relationship between firms’ leverage and tax ratios. The tax findings are in favour of the 
corporate finance argument, suggesting that we are able to support the standard corporate finance 
view. We further analyse tax in section 5.4. In general, we find that results are relatively 
significant for market leverage. For example, consistent with our hypotheses, leverage is 
positively related to bond market development, measured by public bonds over GDP, and 
negatively related to stock market development, measured by the logarithm of the number of 
listed companies.  
The overall results suggest that country level effects are important for banks, which is in line 
with the argument of Fan et al. (2012), who show that country level variables are important in 
explaining the capital structure of non-financial firms. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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The analysis of country level institutional structures raises some endogeneity issues
12
, since 
we expect banks and markets to develop ways that satisfy the financing needs of firms, as well as 
the preferences of investors. The inclusion of stock/bond market size may be questionable; these 
variables could be influenced by the capital structure choices of firms (banks). For example, in 
countries with a higher number of firms that require considerable amounts of equity capital, the 
stock market is likely to be larger. The same argument can be made with respect to measures of 
the tax system. For example, a country’s overarching policy objectives may simultaneously drive 
tax rates and other fiscal and monetary policies that impact on bank financing decisions. Our 
bank level variable only models (Tables 4 and Appendix 2) show that the results are not driven 
by endogeneity, as the sign and significance of the bank level variables do not disappear after we 
include the country level and institutional variables (Table 5). To reconfirm, we include other 
country level variables without the size of the stock market, gross domestic savings and public 
bond over GDP (Models 1 and 3, Table 5). We also run our regressions with other country level 
variables, but excluding the Miller tax ratio, and the results are similar.
13
  
5.3 Legal Systems and Leverage  
We now turn our attention to the differences in influence of country level variables 
between developed and developing economies. The legal structure is normally weak in 
developing countries. With weak legal structures in these economies, the role played by creditor 
rights and bankruptcy code is unclear. In particular, we examine if there is any difference in the 
country level and institutional variables between developing and developed countries. If there is, 
then where does it come from? With respect to variables such as creditor rights and bankruptcy 
                                                          
12 We are not aware of any recent studies that have raised endogeneity concerns for analysing capital structure in similar settings 
to ours. For instance, Bessler et. al., (2013) and Fan et. al., (2012) use similar institutional variables for non-financial firms.   
13 These results are not reported for the sake of brevity and are available upon request.  
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codes having a first order effect through the banks’ lending activity, we examine the impact of 
these two variables in details. 
The results for the different impacts of creditor rights and bankruptcy codes on the capital 
structure of banks are reported in Table 6. When we partition the sample according to whether 
the countries are developed or developing, the results show that creditor rights are not significant 
in the developed countries sample. However, creditor rights are significant in the developing 
sample, showing that as creditor rights increase, leverage increases. In the presence of 
bankruptcy codes, leverage is higher in both the developed and developing samples. To further 
explore how bankruptcy codes and creditor rights influence each other in capital structure 
decisions, we estimate the equations in the high versus low creditor rights samples and in 
countries with explicit bankruptcy code versus those without. We find interesting results. 
Creditor rights and bankruptcy codes are positively related to leverage. On the other hand, 
countries with lower creditor rights and no bankruptcy codes are not significant, meaning that in 
countries with lower creditor rights, bankruptcy codes do not matter. When we partition the 
samples based on explicit bankruptcy codes we find similar results. We find that in countries 
with explicit bankruptcy codes, creditor rights are significant. These results taken together 
suggest that the overall investor protection environment represented by creditor rights and 
bankruptcy codes works in a complementary way, rather than as one based on substitutes. In all 
these regressions, M/B is positive and ROAA is negative, showing consistency with our baseline 
results.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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5.4 Tax Systems and Leverage 
In previous regressions, we use the Miller tax ratio (1977), using the tax gain from leverage 
to control for a country’s tax system. We calculated the ratio for each country and year, taking 
account of corporate and personal income tax on interest and equity. However, we did not 
differentiate explicitly between different tax systems: the classical, the partial and the full 
dividend imputation. To examine the impact of taxes further, we use three samples: the classical, 
partial and full dividend imputation system. We expect that banks located in countries with the 
classical tax system, where the tax gain from leverage is positive, would use more debt compared 
to countries with other tax systems. 
The results are reported in Table 8. For the classical tax system countries, the results show 
(Equation 1) that the gains from leverage positively influence the leverage of banks. While the 
effect is positive for the partial tax system countries, the coefficient is smaller compared to the 
classical tax system (0.036, t=3.21 for the classical, compared to 0.024, t=2.70 for the partial 
system). The results show that the full imputation system does not significantly relate to the 
leverage choice for banks and that in the classical tax system, where the tax gain from leverage is 
positive, banks have more leverage compared to other tax systems. 
In the classical tax countries, creditor rights and bankruptcy codes are positive and 
significant. This means that suppliers of credit weigh the benefit of tax more positively in the 
presence of the higher investor protection environments, e.g., creditor rights and bankruptcy 
codes. On the other hand, in full imputation system countries, neither of the creditor rights and 
investor protection variables are significant, showing that the suppliers of credit do not obtain 
much tax gain and hence the creditor rights protection environment is irrelevant. Again, M/B is 
positively and ROAA is negatively related to leverage, consistent with our previous findings. 
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.5 Decomposing Leverage 
Unlike firms’ capital structure, banks’ capital structure includes deposits which are the 
source of capital not available for firms. Therefore, this section decomposes bank liabilities into 
deposit and non-deposit liabilities. We report the results of estimating Equation (2) for deposit 
and non-deposit liabilities in Table 8. 
The results in Table 8, Panel A, suggest that there are some significant differences between 
deposit and non-deposit liabilities at both market and book values. The market-to-book ratio is 
positive and significant for both the book and market values of non-deposit liabilities, but its sign 
is opposite for deposit liabilities at the market value and insignificant at book value. The signs of 
the coefficients in the leverage regression using non-deposit liabilities are the same as in 
previous leverage regressions in Table 4 , except profitability and risk. The negative coefficient 
of risk for non-deposit liabilities at both book and market values is in line with the studies on 
firms’ leverage (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1998; Frank and Goyal, 2008, 2009). The positive 
relationship between non-deposit liabilities and profitability is in line with corporate finance 
theory, suggesting that profitable banks are less risky and hence have better access to debt 
market. This result is also consistent with Gropp and Heider (2010), who find that profitable 
banks use more non-deposit liabilities as they are less prone to default. Collateral becomes 
insignificant for either deposit or non-deposit liabilities. For deposit liabilities, size is positive 
and insignificant at the market value, while it is negative and significant at the book value. Risk 
has the opposite sign between deposit and non-deposit liabilities. 
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Although the R
2
 is relatively similar across deposit and non-deposit liabilities using book and 
market values, the overall results suggest that the standard corporate finance argument works 
relatively better for non-deposit than deposit liabilities. The results for non-deposit liabilities are 
consistent with those of Fan et al. (2012), De Jong et al. (2008), and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovis (1999) for firms’ leverage. Unlike non-deposit liabilities, dividends are positive and 
significant, supporting the notion that banks that pay dividends are expected to face lower costs 
of issuing equity at short notice because they are better known to the market (Gropp and Heider, 
2010). In summary, our results suggest that standard corporate finance theory works better when 
banks use more non-deposit liabilities in their capital structure.  
The estimates of the country level variables on deposit and non-deposit liabilities are 
reported in Panel B. The results show that, except for size, the estimated coefficients for banks’ 
characteristics are no longer significant when the dependent variable is decomposed into deposit 
and non-deposit liabilities. The relatively insignificant estimated coefficients for bank level 
variables, at both market and book values, suggest that the country level variables are  first-order 
determinants of banks’ funding sources, as the standard corporate finance determinants have 
little or no explanatory power in determining sources of banks’ capital structure when we control 
for country-level characteristics. The magnitude and significance of country level variables 
suggest that country effects are more important for funding sources for banks.    
Taking the results of Table 5 into account, our findings suggest that the standard corporate 
finance style regression works better for leverage itself than for the components of leverage. This 
is also more pronounced for the book leverage ratio, as the R
2
 decreased from 0.86, in Table 5, to 
around 68-69% in regressions with deposit and non-deposit liabilities, as shown in Table 8. The 
signs of the estimated coefficients for the country-level variables are relatively the same as 
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before for total leverage (market and book values) when the dependent variables is non-deposit 
liabilities. For non-deposit liabilities, the signs of the coefficients of bankruptcy code, common 
law, deposit insurance, and public bonds to GDP are opposite, while for deposit liabilities,  the 
coefficients have the same signs as for total leverage. Interestingly, in line with the corporate 
finance view, our results provide strong evidence that tax is positively related to deposit 
liabilities, while its impact is weak for non-deposit liabilities.  
The overall results suggest that the legal environment has an important impact on banks’ 
leverage and its components. Our findings show that banks in common law countries with 
greater domestic savings and an explicit deposit insurance have lower leverage; in particular, 
they have lower deposit liabilities but greater non-deposit ones. At the same time, banks in 
countries with explicit bankruptcy codes, a higher corruption index, higher growth rates, and 
developed bond and stock markets, tend to use lower non-deposit liabilities. These results are 
qualitatively similar at both market and book values.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.6 Tier I capital and leverage 
We investigate whether the same variables that explain leverage of banks explain the tier I 
capital. In particular, we identify the effects of Tier 1 capital ratios in Table 9. Column two in 
Table 9 shows the results for Tier 1 capital as the dependent variable. The results are 
considerably consistent with those reported for leverage in Table 4 and Appendix 2.  
In line with Gropp and Heider (2010), we estimate the following regression to examine 
banks whose capital is close to the regulatory minimum, Close: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡………… (3) 
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where the dependent variable is book leverage. We use two definitions of Close; a dummy that is 
equal to one if a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio is less than the capital requirement in accordance with 
Basel II (0.08) in column four, and less than the sample median (0.094) in column six in the 
previous year. We use the sample median as an alternative threshold because of the lower 
number of observations for banks with Tier 1 capital of less than 8%. The results of the two 
ratios are qualitatively similar. All the coefficients on interaction variables (𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) are insignificant, except risk and dividends. Risk is positive and significant only for 
banks below 0.094 Tier 1 capital, while the relationship between risk and leverage is 
significantly weak for banks close to the regulatory minimum (8%). Dividends are positive and 
significant for both levels of capital requirements. Consistent with Gropp and Heider (2010) who 
argue that banks are less levered if they face a higher cost of issuing equity, our results confirm 
that dividend paying banks have higher leverage as they are expected to have a lower cost of 
issuing equity at short notice. Our results suggest that regulation is matter for banks which hold 
their capital close to their capital requirements.  
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
5.7 Speed of Adjustments and Regulations 
Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), who show that, according to the partial 
adjustment model of firms’ leverage, firms do have target capital structures and adjust toward 
them, we attempt to ascertain whether their model also extends to banks’ capital structure. The 
results based on both book and market values of leverage are reported in Table 10, where 
standard errors are clustered at the bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation of errors. We use the fixed effects model, as pooled OLS underestimates the speed of 
adjustment (Flannery and Rangan, 2006).   
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The results show that for market leverage in Model (1) the speed of adjustment is 
λ=1−0.707=0.293, as compared to that of book leverage in Model (4), λ=1−0.629=0.371, and is 
thus economically significant. Adding firm level characteristics in Models 2 and 5, the speed of 
adjustment increases to 0.506 and 0.537 for market and book leverage respectively, which are 
greater than the 0.380 for non-financial firms in Flannery and Rangan (2006). Our speed of 
adjustment coefficients are even higher than Gropp and Heider (2010), which they estimated as 
0.45. The economically significant speed of adjustment provides evidence against the regulatory 
view of banks, which asserts that banks should converge to a common target.  
Next, we estimate the speed of adjustment by considering regulatory Tier 1 capital 
(Tierone) as an additional explanatory variable in Models 3 and 6 for market and book leverage, 
respectively. The results show that adding regulatory capital does not affect the speed of 
adjustment significantly for the market value of leverage in Model 3. The speed of adjustment 
increases only by 2.8 percentage points (from 0.506 to 0.534). However, the results are different 
when we use the book value of leverage in Model 6, suggesting that the speed of adjustment 
decreases from 0.537 to 0.467 (6.1 percentage points). The results suggest that the effect of 
regulation is relatively more visible for book leverage. Since the effect of regulation is more 
visible in the case of book leverage (Gropp and Heider, 2010), the speed of adjustment decreases 
as a result of holding of Tier 1 capital. This suggests that holding regulatory capital decreases the 
speed of adjustment to a certain degree. Thus, it is very important to consider regulatory capital 
when estimating the speed of adjustment for the capital structure of banks. The coefficients of 
the explanatory variables keep the same sign as in Tables 5 and Appendix 2, except for risk 
(Risk), which is significantly negative when using market leverage.   
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5.8 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we perform a series of sensitivity analysis tests to check the robustness of our 
results. Notably, we use an alternative sample period as well as alternative sample compositions. 
5.8.1 Financial Crisis 
The recent financial crisis was an exogenous shock to most countries and the supply of bank 
credit was interrupted. As a robustness check, we examine the impact of financial crisis on 
different factors affecting leverage. We report the sensitivity of our analyses with regard to the 
financial crisis of 2007 in Table 11. Akhigbe et al. (2012) argue that the recent crisis caused 
weak returns and a higher bank risk in general. In particular, they find that although banks’ stock 
price declined significantly during the financial crisis, those with more capital experienced more 
severe declines. Therefore, our different results compared to those of Gropp and Heider (2010) 
might suggest that they are driven by the impact of financial crisis. To address this issue, we 
rerun our regressions with and without the crisis period and the results are reported in Table 11.  
Panel A shows the results for market and book leverage. Our results are qualitatively similar 
for bank characteristics, except that when we exclude the financial crisis period, market leverage 
is independent of size and collateral. Bank leverage is positively related to market-to-book ratios 
(M/B), size, and collateral, and, negatively related to profitability. The similarity in sign and 
significance of the estimated coefficients for bank leverage to corporate finance view suggests 
that the buffer view does not completely apply to banks’ capital structure. After controlling for 
country factors, the results did not change significantly, except that when the dependent variable 
is market leverage, there are some differences related to creditor rights and deposit insurance, 
which are not surprising as an impact of financial crisis. Creditor rights are negatively related to 
leverage during the crisis, while positively associated with leverage in the non-crisis period. The 
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results are relatively similar for deposit insurance, which is negative and significant in the crisis, 
but insignificant in the non-crisis period. A few countries, such as Canada, were not adversely 
affected by the financial crisis at all. On the other hand, some countries were also affected by 
financial crises before 2007; for example some East Asian countries were severely impacted by 
the Asian Flu outbreak after 1997. Against this background, we include appropriate dummy 
variables according to the dates of financial crises, as well as the countries involved. However, 
the results remain qualitatively the same. We do not report these results in order to save space. 
In Panel B, we use the market values of deposit and non-deposit leverage, and in Panel C, we 
use their book values. In both panels, the results are qualitatively similar, suggesting that 
whenever an estimated coefficient is significant, it has the opposite sign for deposit and non-
deposit liabilities. In Panel B, the overall results for crisis and non-crisis periods are similar, 
except the market-to-book ratio (M/B), return on average assets (ROAA), and Tier 1 capital 
(Tierone). The market-to-book ratio is no longer a significant explanatory variable for either 
component of leverage when we exclude the financial crisis period. In contrast, Tier 1 capital is 
insignificant for both deposit and non-deposit liabilities during the crisis period. The coefficient 
of return on average assets is only significant for the market values of non-deposit liabilities. 
In Panel C, when the dependent variable is non-deposit liabilities, the signs of the estimated 
coefficients are the same as before for total leverage (Panel A), apart from collateral and Tier 1 
capital, which are no longer significant. Moreover, the results for the crisis and non-crisis periods 
are relatively similar, except the market-to-book ratio and Tier 1 capital. The coefficients on Tier 
1 capital are insignificant for both components of leverage in the crisis period. The market-to-
book ratio is positive and significant when the dependent variable is non-deposit liabilities in the 
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crisis period, but negative and insignificant in the non-crisis period. These results are reversed 
when the dependent variable is deposits.   
[Insert Table 11 here] 
5.8.2 Alternative Sample Compositions 
We assess if our results are sensitive to sample selections. In Table 12, panel A, we report the 
results for bank leverage based on market values in Europe and developed countries in Models 
(1) and (2) respectively. These results are qualitatively similar to our baseline results. As our 
results persists in both the EU and developed economy subsamples, it may be a product of a 
changing regulatory environment, changing structures in banks or the financial crisis. In Model 
(3), we re-estimate our regression for the period 1998-2004 to investigate the determinants of 
banks’ market leverage under the Basel I regulatory regime in Model (3). In summary, our 
results are qualitatively similar, suggesting that they are not driven by the European and 
developed countries sample, nor the Basel I regulatory regime, the changing structure of banks or 
the financial crisis. Our results are also robust with the book values of leverage in Models (4)-
(6). 
In Panel B, we replicate our regressions for source of financing, deposit- and non-deposit 
liabilities, based on market values for the European sample (Model 1), developed countries 
(Model 2), and sample period 1998-2004 (Model 3). The coefficients have the same sign as in 
our results documented in Table 6, suggesting that standard corporate finance theory works 
better when banks use more non-deposit liabilities in their capital structure. We repeat all the 
robustness checks based on book values in Models (4)-(6) and our results are qualitatively 
similar.  
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[Insert Table 12 here] 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we investigate the determinants of banks’ capital structure. Our sample includes 
347 large banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 2012. We provide evidence that banks’ capital 
structure is determined by the country in which they are located. In particular, in line with 
Bessler et al. (2013) and Fan et al. (2012), who find that the institutional environment plays an 
important role in non-financial firms’ leverage, we show that banks in countries with bankruptcy 
codes and deposit insurance have higher leverage. Moreover, banks’ leverage is lower in 
common law and corrupt countries. These findings are consistent with the previous literature on 
the significance of the legal system, the protection of investor rights, and resolution of financial 
distress (Fan et al., 2012; Djankov et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998). Consistent with the corporate finance argument and the findings of Fan et al. (2012) for 
non-financial firms, we find that banks use more debt in the classical tax system where the tax 
gain from leverage is positive. These results are relatively consistent at both book and market 
values. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that the overall investor protection environment represented 
by creditor rights and bankruptcy codes is complementary, rather than one based on substitution. 
In the classical tax countries, suppliers of credit weigh the benefit of tax more positively in the 
presence of higher creditor rights and bankruptcy codes. On the other hand, in full imputation 
system countries, the suppliers of credit do not obtain much tax gain and hence the creditor rights 
protection environment is irrelevant.  These results are consistent with the empirical literature on 
firms’ leverage (e.g., De Jong et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovis, 1999). We do not 
find significant evidence to support the impact of creditors’ rights and bond market development. 
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Our results suggest that market leverage is negatively related to the development of stock 
markets, which is in line with the argument that costs of equity are lower in countries with 
developed stock markets, resulting in lower leverage (De Jong et al., 2008).  
Examining the composition of banks’ leverage without including the country level data, the 
results are qualitatively similar to those of leverage, apart from the market-to-book ratio, which 
is weakly related to deposit liabilities. However, when we control for country level 
characteristics, the estimated coefficients do not remain significant, except the coefficient of the 
market-to-book ratio for non-deposit liabilities at the market value and the coefficient on size, 
which is positive and significant for non-deposit liabilities, but negative for deposits at both 
market and book values. Therefore, the failure of banks’ characteristics to determine the shift 
away from deposits towards non-deposit liabilities supports the role of regulation in banks’ 
sources of finance.   
As a robustness check, we rerun our regressions for crisis and non-crisis periods. While not 
all of our results hold across all sub periods, some of the results are significantly strong. For 
example, we find that market leverage is independent of size and collateral when we exclude the 
financial crisis period, while other estimated coefficients, including market-to-book ratios, return 
on average assets, and Tier 1 capital, are very strong and robust across the sub periods. The 
overall results for bank characteristics are relatively consistent for the book value of leverage. 
Moreover, the results do not change significantly for country effects across different periods, 
except that when the dependent variable is market leverage, there are some differences in 
creditor rights and deposit insurance. Creditor rights are negatively related to leverage during the 
crisis, while positively associated with leverage in the non-crisis period. The results are relatively 
similar for deposit insurance, which is negative and significant in the crisis, but insignificant in 
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the non-crisis period. Tax is strongly and positively related to leverage in market and book 
leverage. Furthermore, corruption, stock market development, and domestic savings are strong 
for market leverage in all sub periods.  
Our paper broadly supports the corporate finance view on banks’ capital structure. Our 
analysis may suffer from a number of limitations. We assume that banks are subject to the taxes 
of their country of registration, while many banks are international and have overseas income. 
Eun and Wang (2016) show that international sourcing has a negative effect on financial 
leverage, an issue that we do not address in this paper. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that 
banks’ capital structure is mainly driven by the asset side of their balance sheet, which is also not 
examined in this paper. Moreover, we do not investigate managerial preference. For example, 
overconfident CEOs may feel their company’s share price to be undervalued. They persistently 
perceive equity financing to be more mispriced than debt financing and hence are less likely to 
use equity (see Heaton, 2002). Malmendier et al. (2011) argue that the net effect of managerial 
overconfidence on leverage depends on a manager’s perceived financing costs and investment 
returns. Overall, the extent to which these factors will strengthen or alter our results should be a 
subject for further research.  
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Table 1: The Sample Banks and Bank-Years across Countries 
Country  Bank  Bank-years Country Bank  Bank-years 
Australia 6 90 Kazakhstan 1 15 
Austria 4 60 Korea republic of 3 45 
Bahrain 2 30 Kuwait 2 30 
Belgium 1 15 Malaysia 3 45 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 30 Morocco 3 45 
Brazil 4 60 Netherlands 2 30 
Canada 9 135 Norway 2 30 
Chile 5 75 Oman 1 15 
China 16 240 Peru 1 15 
Colombia 3 45 Philippines 1 15 
Croatia 2 30 Poland 9 135 
Cyprus 1 15 Portugal 4 60 
Czech republic 1 15 Qatar 2 30 
Denmark 3 45 Romania 1 15 
Estonia 1 15 Russian federation 5 75 
Finland 2 30 Saudi Arabia 6 90 
France 16 240 Singapore 2 30 
Germany 6 90 South Africa 2 30 
Greece 6 90 Spain 12 180 
Hong Kong 4 60 Sweden 4 60 
Hungary 1 15 Switzerland 4 60 
Iceland 1 15 Taiwan 3 45 
India 28 420 Thailand 6 90 
Indonesia 6 90 Turkey 8 120 
Ireland 3 45 United Arab emirates 6 90 
Israel 5 75 United kingdom 10 150 
Italy 17 255 United states of America 17 255 
Japan 69 1035 Vietnam 2 30 
Jordan 1 15 Total 347 5,205 
This table provides the number of banks and bank-year observations for each country. The sample consists of 347 
banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 2012, resulting in 5,205 bank-year observations. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean SD Median Min Max 
Book leverage 0.928 0.035 0.938 0.803 0.982 
Market leverage 0.878 0.116 0.919 0.454 0.996 
Bookdep/TA  0.774 0.165 0.825 0.229 0.953 
Market dep/TA 0.837 0.175 0.911 0.253 0.990 
Book nondep/TA 0.154 0.165 0.083 0.010 0.697 
Mktnondep/TA 0.163 0.175 0.089 0.010 0.747 
Log Size ($ Bil) 17.505 1.576 17.213 10.656 21.843 
Divdum 0.928 0.258 1.000 0.000 1.000 
M/B 0.926 0.052 0.935 0.497 2.268 
STDEV 0.569 0.402 0.475 0.094 1.913 
ROAA 0.007 0.006 0.011 -0.042 0.036 
Collateral 0.291 0.138 0.277 0.005 0.866 
Tierone 0.101 0.035 0.094 0.043 0.233 
Crisis 0.400 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
GDP growth 0.029 0.035 0.025 -0.057 0.120 
Log GDS $ Bil 2.343 0.656 2.442 -1.067 3.585 
log no of listed companies 2.945 0.637 3.009 0.845 3.927 
deposit insurance 0.860 0.347 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Bankruptcy code 0.660 0.474 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Public Bond/GDP 0.616 0.509 0.429 0.016 2.189 
Miller tax ratio 0.209 0.154 0.250 -0.330 0.550 
Classical tax =1 0.566 0.496 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Creditor rights 1.856 0.900 2.000 0.000 4.000 
Corruption Index 0.677 0.468 1 0 1 
Developed 5.913 2.054 6.2 1.7 10 
This table provides the mean, standard deviation (SD), median, minimum, and maximum of each variable. The 
variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3 provides a correlation matrix for our sample. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Bold numbers are significant at 5% or better level. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 Book leverage 1.00
2 Market leverage 0.51 1.00
3 Bookdep/TA 0.11 0.04 1.00
4 Market dep/TA 0.10 0.07 -0.98 1.00
5 Book nondep/TA -0.07 -0.04 0.98 -0.99 1.00
6 Mktnondep/TA 0.12 0.04 -0.92 0.95 -0.94 1.00
7 M/B 0.91 0.45 0.13 0.06 -0.04 0.09 1.00
8 ROAA -0.56 -0.52 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.52 1.00
9 Log Size ($ Bil) 0.29 0.26 -0.43 0.50 -0.48 0.46 0.25 -0.17 1.00
10 Collateral 0.18 -0.04 -0.08 0.13 -0.11 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.26 1.00
11 STDEV 0.04 0.11 0.17 -0.16 0.16 -0.13 0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.00 1.00
12 Divdum 0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.09 -0.01 0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.03 1.00
13 Tierone -0.69 -0.45 -0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.59 0.50 -0.06 0.26 -0.04 -0.05 1.00
14 Developed 0.21 0.29 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.19 -0.24 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.15 -0.31 1.00
15 Inflation -0.21 -0.24 -0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.20 0.12 -0.15 0.13 -0.02 -0.16 0.20 -0.23 1.00
16 Corruption Index -0.24 -0.37 0.16 -0.20 0.18 -0.19 -0.20 0.24 -0.38 0.14 -0.01 -0.16 0.19 -0.33 0.42 1.00
17 Creditor rights 0.21 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.22 -0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03 1.00
18 Bankruptcy code 0.44 0.40 0.18 -0.09 0.11 -0.11 0.41 -0.32 0.20 -0.03 0.09 0.16 -0.39 0.00 -0.25 -0.36 0.15 1.00
19 Miller tax ratio 0.30 0.16 0.16 -0.10 0.11 -0.07 0.28 -0.26 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.19 -0.30 0.16 -0.33 -0.16 -0.01 0.34 1.00
20 common law -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 0.13 -0.13 0.06 -0.09 0.18 0.09 0.11 -0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.16 -0.01 1.00
21 deposit insurance 0.23 0.24 -0.14 0.19 -0.18 0.13 0.20 -0.28 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.20 0.24 0.07 -0.11 -0.24 0.07 0.06 -0.18 1.00
22 Public Bond/GDP 0.21 0.39 0.38 -0.35 0.36 -0.34 0.18 -0.31 -0.06 -0.04 0.12 0.15 -0.10 0.40 -0.29 -0.37 0.01 0.18 0.36 -0.34 0.24 1.00
23 Log GDS $ Bil 0.30 0.40 0.10 -0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.26 -0.28 0.32 0.06 0.09 0.15 -0.30 0.29 -0.23 -0.23 0.11 0.37 0.48 -0.06 0.13 0.53 1.00
24 GDP growth -0.16 -0.25 0.07 -0.10 0.10 -0.11 -0.14 0.40 -0.21 0.11 -0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.20 0.12 0.42 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 0.21 -0.31 -0.43 -0.14 1.00
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Table 4: Buffer View vs Corporate Finance View  
 Market Leverage Book Leverage Gropp and Heider 
(2010) Table 5, Column 
2 
M/B 0.731*** 0.883*** -0.560*** 
SE 0.146 0.020 0.034 
Elasticity 0.777 0.882 -0.683 
ROAA  -4.794*** -0.105*** -0.298*** 
SE 0.641 0.045 0.097 
Elasticity -0.053 -0.001 -0.018 
log(size) 0.017*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 
SE 0.003 0.0001 0.001 
Elasticity 0.339 0.029 0.007 
Collateral 0.109
*** 0.002 0.020* 
SE 0.032 0.003 0.012 
Elasticity 0.038 0.001 0.006 
Dividends 0.005 0.003* -0.019*** 
SE 0.011 0.002 0.004 
Elasticity 0.005 0.003 -0.020 
Constant -0.026 0.080*** 1.360*** 
SE 0.153 0.019 0.039 
N 5,205 5,205 2,415 
Adj R
2
 0.39 0.85 0.79 
 
The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 
2012: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑗.𝑡 + 𝐶𝑗
+ 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The dependent variable is market leverage in column tw and book leverage in column three. The explanatory 
variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B), return on average assets (ROAA), the log of total assets (Size), 
collateral (Collateral) and a dummy for dividend paying banks (Div) for bank i in country j in year t (see Appendix1 
for the definition of variables). All these variables are lagged by one year except dividend dummy. Time (ct) and 
country (cj) fixed effects and are included in the regression to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country 
level and across time that might be correlated with the independent variables. Following Petersen (2009), we employ 
cluster adjusted standard errors at the bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors.∗∗∗, 
∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Determinants of Leverage-Country Effects 
  Market Leverage Book Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Banks’ variables         
M/B 0.433
***
 3.20 0.478
***
 3.31 0.710
***
 23.65 0.725
***
 22.59 
ROAA -3.443
***
 -6.53 -3.156
***
 -5.41 -0.082 -1.10 -0.225
***
 -3.42 
Log(size) 0.007
***
 3.51 0.006
***
 2.60 0.001
***
 5.18 0.002
***
 4.11 
Collateral 0.015 0.55 0.027 1.05 0.027
***
 6.29 0.019
***
 4.99 
Risk 0.014
***
 2.61 0.006 1.12 0.000 -0.20 -0.001 -0.94 
Tierone -0.460
***
 -3.85 -0.444
***
 -3.74 -0.247
***
 -8.52 -0.205
***
 -7.81 
Countries’ variables         
Developed 0.002 0.26 -0.010 -0.91 -0.001 -0.57 -0.001 -0.80 
Inflation 0.058 0.34 0.261 1.43 -0.005 -0.29 0.012 0.53 
Corruption index -0.126
**
 -2.05 -0.117 -1.58 -0.006 -0.68 -0.013 -1.27 
Creditor rights 0.000 -0.02 0.002 0.34 0.002
***
 3.18 0.002
**
 2.50 
Bankruptcy code 0.023
**
 2.55 0.015 1.54 0.003
**
 2.42 0.002 1.23 
Miller tax 0.060
**
 2.51 0.040
**
 2.02 0.012
***
 3.25 0.010
***
 2.18 
Common law -0.025
***
 -2.69 -0.015 -1.30 -0.005
***
 -4.00 -0.006
***
 -3.87 
Deposit insurance -0.019 -1.59 -0.032
**
 -2.10 0.002
**
 2.13 0.003
*
 1.68 
GDP growth -0.154
***
 -2.68 -0.273
***
 -5.12 0.026
***
 2.59 0.034
***
 3.39 
Crisis 0.042
***
 6.33 0.036
***
 5.45 0.001 0.70 0.002
**
 2.26 
Log listed companies 
  
-0.033
***
 -3.36 
  
0.002 1.36 
Log (GDS bil) 
  
0.037
***
 3.62 
  
-0.003
**
 -2.17 
Public bond/GDP 
  
0.018
**
 2.31 
  
0.001 0.60 
Cons 0.447
***
 3.46 0.437*** 3.09 0.259*** 8.47 0.243*** 7.28 
N 
 
5,205  5,205  5,205  5,205 
Adj R
2
 
 
0.58 
 
0.57 
 
0.87 
 
0.86 
The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 
2012: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1
+ 𝜇 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + Ω𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
The dependent variable is market leverage in columns two and four, and book leverage in columns six and eight. 
The explanatory variables include both bank- and country-level variables which are defined in Appendix 1. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 
2009).∗∗∗,∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Legal Systems and Leverage  
 
Developed Developing 
Creditor 
rights>median 
Creditor 
rights<median 
Bankruptcy 
code=1 
Bankruptcy 
code=0 
 ( 1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) 
M/B 0.674*** 0.583*** 0.619*** 0.719*** 0.708*** 0.582*** 
  (4.20) (3.28) (4.34) (4.43) (5.51) (4.27) 
ROAA -0.455*** -0.518*** -0.388*** -0.408*** -0.319*** -0.553*** 
  (-9.97) (-6.80) (-8.44) (-4.96) (-6.38) (-8.16) 
Log(size) 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001* 
  (7.06) (3.07) (7.25) (1.09) (6.14) (2.06) 
Collateral 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.039*** 
  (7.06) (4.59) (9.65) (4.09) (7.72) (6.51) 
Dividends 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004** -0.001 
  (3.11) (-0.19) (0.80) (1.05) (3.08) (-0.37) 
Risk -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.75) (-0.21) (-0.82) (-0.33) -0.19 (-0.59) 
Tier one -0.208*** -0.255*** -0.225*** -0.194*** -0.210*** -0.249*** 
  (-16.59) (-11.12) (-19.39) (-6.96) (-16.01) (-11.87) 
Inflation  0.042* -0.004 0.026* 0.021 0.009 0.002 
  (2.38) (-0.20) (1.99) (0.54) (0.47) (0.09) 
Corruption index -0.077*** 0.004 -0.014** -0.041* -0.017* -0.012 
  (-7.28) (0.40) (-2.70) (-2.35) (-2.41) (-1.28) 
Creditor rights 0.001 0.002* -- -- 0.002*** 0.001 
  (1.40) (2.37) -- -- (4.58) (0.46) 
Bankruptcy code 0.003*** 0.006** 0.005*** 0.002 -- -- 
  (3.55) (2.97) (6.01) (0.93) -- -- 
Miller tax 0.028*** 0.012 0.004 0.033*** 0.020*** 0.001 
  (6.86) (1.17) (0.90) (3.42) (3.60) (1.67) 
Common law -0.012*** -0.002 -0.003** -0.006** -0.007*** 0.001 
  (-11.15) (-1.21) (-3.24) (-2.64) (-9.10) -0.24 
Deposit insurance -0.005** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
  (-3.19) (-0.03) (0.98) (-0.01) (0.94) (0.92) 
crisis 0.001 -0.005** 0.001* -0.002 0.003*** -0.008*** 
  (0.86) (-3.05) (2.35) (-0.94) (4.86) (-4.90) 
constant 0.304*** 0.376*** 0.340*** 0.274*** 0.265*** 0.388*** 
  (20.56) (15.04) (24.70) (8.78) (19.44) (14.94) 
        
Adj R
2
 0.894 0.864 0.901 0.854 0.87 0.876 
N 2229 1465 3315 1381 3251 1445 
The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 
2012: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1
+ 𝜇 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + Ω𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
The dependent variable is book leverage in developed, developing, countries with creditor rights greater than median 
(2), countries with creditor rights less than median, countries with explicit bankruptcy costs, countries without 
explicit bankruptcy codes in columns 1-6, respectively. The explanatory variables include both bank- and country-
level variables which are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 2009).∗∗∗,∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 
1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Tax system and Leverage  
 Classical Partial Full Imputation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
M/B 0.685*** 0.548*** 0.667*** 
  (4.01) (8.31) (7.92) 
ROAA -0.455*** -0.442*** -0.645*** 
  (-9.37) (-4.30) (-6.41) 
Log(size) 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 
  (4.83) (-0.22) (3.50) 
Collateral 0.028*** 0.029** 0.011* 
  (8.47) (3.15) (2.19) 
Dividends 0.003* 0.017*** -0.002 
  (1.96) (4.47) (-0.94) 
Risk -0.002** 0.001 0.001 
  (-2.78) (0.38) (0.45) 
Tier one -0.206*** -0.296*** -0.168*** 
  (-14.66) (-10.80) (-6.16) 
Developed -0.003* -0.001 0.001 
 (-2.09) (-0.33) -0.54 
Inflation  0.014 0.019 0.098** 
  (0.74) (0.75) (3.11) 
Corruption index -0.024** 0.01 -0.047 
  (-2.83) (0.57) (-1.74) 
Creditor rights 0.003*** 0.003* -0.001 
  (4.45) (2.11) (-1.30) 
Bankruptcy code 0.004* 0.004 0.001 
  (2.06) (1.54) (-0.18) 
Miller tax 0.036** 0.027** 0.007 
  (3.21) (2.70) (0.83) 
Common law -0.007*** -0.003 0.002 
  (-7.09) (-0.82) (0.84) 
Deposit insurance 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.04) (0.62) (0.59) 
crisis 0.002* -0.006** -0.004** 
  (2.06) (-2.81) (-3.02) 
constant 0.286*** 0.429*** 0.311*** 
  (17.49) (13.14) (8.37) 
     
Adj R
2
 0.874 0.884 0.935 
N 2124 1297 1254 
The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 
2012: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1
+ 𝜇 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + Ω𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
The dependent variable book leverage in classical, partial and full imputation system countries in Models 1-3, 
respectively. In the classical tax system, where shareholders pay personal taxes on distributed earnings in addition to 
the corporate taxes paid on those earrings, the tax gain from leverage is positive. Countries located in a dividend tax 
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relief, where divided payments are taxed at a reduced rate at the personal level, have negative values for the tax gain. 
The tax gain from leverage is zero under a full dividend imputation tax system, where shareholders pay personal 
taxes on distributed income but receive full tax credit for the corporate taxes paid on these incomes. The explanatory 
variables include both bank- and country-level variables which are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 
2009).∗∗∗,∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Financing Sources 
  Market value Book value 
 Dependent variable Non-deposit Deposit Non-deposit Deposit 
 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Panel A:Financing Sources 
M/B 0.542
**
 2.32 -0.447
*
 -1.83 0.524
**
 2.36 0.337 1.46 
ROAA 2.043
***
 3.16 -3.016
***
 -3.71 2.741
***
 3.72 -2.951
***
 -3.88 
Log (size) 0.053
***
 9.78 -0.065 -11.4 0.062
***
 11.64 -0.061
***
 -11.3 
Collateral 0.031 0.37 0.004 0.04 0.006 0.07 -0.002 -0.02 
Dividends -0.081
***
 -3.66 0.092
***
 4.22 -0.082
***
 -4.08 0.088
***
 4.15 
Risk -0.036
***
 -2.79 0.042
***
 3.11 -0.040
***
 -3.16 0.039
***
 3.07 
Cons -1.275
***
 -5.20 2.364
***
 9.13 -1.401
***
 -5.90 1.510
***
 6.15 
N 
 
5205 
 
5205 
 
5205 
 
5205 
Adj R
2
 
 
0.317 
 
0.353 
 
0.370 
 
0.354 
Panel B: Financing Sources with Country-Level Variables 
Banks’ variables         
M/B 0.548
**
 2.16 -0.355 -1.25 0.410 1.50 0.308 1.16 
ROAA -0.854 -1.61 0.355 0.54 -0.485 -0.81 0.257 0.42 
Log(size) 0.032
***
 5.99 -0.039
***
 -7.46 0.039
***
 7.71 -0.037
***
 -7.43 
Collateral 0.073 1.18 -0.024 -0.37 0.039 0.65 -0.022 -0.36 
Risk -0.005 -0.48 0.006 0.56 -0.006 -0.58 0.005 0.52 
Tierone -0.116 -0.55 0.127 0.54 -0.212 -0.98 0.010 0.05 
Countries’ variables 
Developed -0.004 -0.14 -0.009 -0.32 0.004 0.17 -0.005 -0.20 
Inflation 0.144 0.57 -0.354 -1.47 0.317 1.41 -0.308 -1.36 
Corruption index -0.570
***
 -4.14 0.702
***
 4.97 -0.665
***
 -5.01 0.654
***
 4.88 
Creditor rights 0.018 1.49 -0.013 -1.10 0.013 1.18 -0.012 -1.07 
Bankruptcy code -0.080
***
 -2.73 0.092
***
 3.25 -0.085
***
 -3.16 0.087
***
 3.28 
Miller tax 0.001 0.27 0.081
**
 2.12 -0.071
**
 -2.21 0.078
**
 2.19 
Common law 0.033
*
 1.64 -0.047
**
 -2.03 0.041
*
 1.89 -0.048
**
 -2.19 
Deposit insurance 0.123
***
 5.31 -0.133
***
 -4.70 0.129
***
 4.88 -0.127
***
 -4.87 
GDP growth -0.246
**
 -2.36 0.249
***
 2.36 -0.211*
*
 -2.16 0.250
**
 2.46 
Crisis 0.024
***
 2.72 -0.025
***
 -2.63 0.023
**
 2.56 -0.021
**
 -2.39 
Loglisted companies -0.097
***
 -2.98 0.090
***
 2.66 -0.082
**
 -2.55 0.084
***
 2.65 
log (GDS bil) 0.079
***
 3.15 -0.076
***
 -2.87 0.068
***
 2.74 -0.072
***
 -2.89 
Public bond/GDP -0.128
***
 -6.96 0.145
***
 7.14 -0.137
***
 -7.15 0.139
***
 7.27 
Cons -0.747
***
 -2.78 1.636
***
 5.52 -0.695
***
 -2.46 0.945
***
 3.41 
N  5205  5205  5205  5205 
Adj R
2
  0.637  0.681  0.689  0.690 
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The table presents the results for financing sources. Panel A shows the results of estimating the following regression 
for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 2012: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The dependent variable is either deposit- or non-deposit liabilities based on market and book values. The 
explanatory variables include both bank- and country-level variables which are defined in Appendix 1. Panel B 
shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 2012: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1
+ 𝜇 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + Ω𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The dependent variable is either deposit- and non-deposit liabilities. The explanatory variables include both bank- 
and country-level variables. All variables  are defined in Appendix 1 
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Table 19: Tier I capital and Leverage  
  
Book leverage 
  
 
Tier 1 capital Close is <0.08 Close is < median (0.094) 
 
coef t coef t coef t 
M/B -0.591
***
 -10.36 0.766
***
 12.89 0.741
***
 13.34 
M/B*Close 
  
0.002 0.10 0.023 0.97 
ROAA 0.298
*
 1.83 0.092 0.23 -0.345 -0.92 
ROAA*Close 
  
-0.279 -0.69 0.100 0.27 
Size 0.000 0.12 0.002
*
 1.79 0.003
**
 2.32 
Size*Close 
  
0.000 -0.02 -0.002 -1.26 
Collateral 0.090
***
 7.48 0.018 1.54 0.005 0.46 
Collateral*Close 
 
-0.007 -0.55 0.007 0.061 
Dividends -0.007 -1.61 -0.011
***
 -3.90 -0.006 -1.66 
Dividends*Close 
  
0.006
***
 2.52 0.004
**
 2.08 
Risk 0.001 0.43 -0.003 -1.09 -0.008
*
 -1.76 
Risk*Close 
  
0.004 1.36 0.008
*
 1.88 
Cons 0.624
***
 11.58 0.197
***
 4.05 0.206
***
 4.79 
Adj R
2
 
 
0.465  0.736  0.719 
N 
 
5205  5205  5205 
The table shows the results of estimating 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 2012. The results of column 
two where the dependent variable is the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio is for the following regression: 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The explanatory variables include bank level variables,𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1, which are defined in Appendix 1. Columns four and 
six report the results for the following estimation: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   
The dependent variable is book leverage. The explanatory variables of both estimations include bank level variables, 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1, which are defined in Appendix 1. The interaction dummy Close is equal to 1 if a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio 
is below 8% (column four) and below 9.4% (column six) in the previous year. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 2009).∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10: Speed of Adjustment 
 Market Leverage Book Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Market Leverage t-1 0.707*** 0.494*** 0.466***    
    (48.15) (26.78) (23.44)    
Book Leverage t-1    0.629*** 0.463*** 0.524*** 
    (41.77) (9.44) (11.52) 
M/B   0.182*** 0.336***  0.117** 0.087** 
  (2.66) (4.24)  (2.55) (2.04) 
ROAA  -0.186 -0.306**  0.06* 0.036 
  (-1.37) (-1.94)  (1.87) (1.17) 
Log(size)  0.040*** 0.050***  0.003*** 0.002*** 
  (13.90) (15.09)  (5.29) (3.21) 
Collateral   0.031 0.070  0.010*** 0.036*** 
   (0.23) (0.81)  (2.64) (9.57) 
Risk   -0.006* -0.006*  -0.001 0.000 
   (-1.89) (-1.91)  (-1.50) (-0.20) 
Tierone    -0.360***   -0.306*** 
    (-6.53)   (-26.93) 
constant 0.264*** -0.086 -0.065 0.343*** 0.443*** 0.576*** 
 (20.57) (-1.00) (-0.66) (24.54) (21.43) (28.82) 
        
Adj R
2
 0.496 0.466 0.471 0.781 0.808 0.836 
N 5205 5205 5205 5205 5205 5205 
Fraction of Variance due to 
Bank FE 0.324 0.752 0.799 0.481 0.701 0.706 
The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 
2012: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + (𝜆𝛽)𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The dependent variable is market leverage in Models 1-3 and book leverage in Models 4-6. 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 which contains 
the same explanatory variables: market-to-book ratio (M/B), return on average assets (ROAA), the natural logarithm 
of total assets (Size), collateral (Collateral) (all lagged by one year), risk and Tier 1 capital (see Appendix 1 for the 
definition of variables). 𝜆 represents the speed of adjustment (see Flannery and Rangan, 2006, for a derivation of the 
model). The regression includes bank fixed effects (cj) to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level that 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level to account for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 2009). ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗denote statistical significance at the 
1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 11: The Financial Crisis and Leverage 
 
Crisis 
 
Non-crisis Crisis 
 
Non-crisis 
 
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
Panel A: Dependent variable-Market and book leverage 
 Market Leverage Book Leverage 
M/B 0.456*** 3.63 0.722
***
 2.91 0.724
***
 20.95 0.693
***
 15.52 
ROAA -3.970*** -4.66 -1.395
***
 -2.99 -0.232
**
 -2.48 -0.200
***
 -2.86 
Log(size) 0.009*** 5.09 -0.004 -0.96 0.002
***
 3.14 0.001
***
 3.26 
Collateral -0.025 -0.94 0.173
***
 3.71 0.025
***
 4.87 0.014
***
 2.78 
Risk 0.003 0.69 0.007 0.97 -0.001 -0.65 0.000 -0.20 
Tierone -0.386*** -3.45 -0.632
***
 -3.24 -0.221
***
 -6.85 -0.191
***
 -6.24 
Developed 0.004 0.33 -0.065*
**
 -2.67 -0.001 -0.44 -0.006
***
 -3.06 
Inflation 0.841*** 4.95 -0.476
*
 -1.84 0.039 1.28 -0.045 -1.26 
Corruption index -0.143* -1.90 -0.206
*
 -1.94 -0.018 -1.37 -0.012 -0.98 
Creditor rights -0.009** -2.24 0.018
**
 2.16 0.001 1.32 0.002
*
 1.81 
Bankruptcy code 0.011 1.19 0.015 0.91 0.003 1.35 -0.003 -1.65 
Miller tax 0.104*** 4.27 0.030
***
 2.53 0.034*** 3.40 0.016
***
 3.23 
Common law 0.002 0.16 -0.019 -0.95 -0.006
***
 -2.70 -0.005
**
 -2.34 
Deposit insurance -0.039** -2.54 0.010 0.49 0.000 0.25 0.002 0.54 
GDP growth -0.246*** -4.25 -0.032 -0.18 0.034
***
 3.33 -0.028 -0.90 
Log listed companies -0.032*** -3.69 -0.035
*
 -1.79 0.001 0.51 0.007
**
 2.51 
Log (GDS bil) 0.039
***
 3.69 0.042
**
 2.36 -0.001 -0.28 -0.006
**
 -2.30 
Public bond/GDP 0.020
***
 3.01 0.032
*
 1.73 0.000 0.03 -0.001 -0.49 
Cons 0.441
***
 3.34 0.324 1.32 0.246
***
 6.77 0.281
***
 6.20 
Adj R2 
 
2082 
 
2943 
 
2082 
 
2943 
N 
 
0.605 
 
0.616 
 
0.862 
 
0.877 
Panel B: Dependent variable-Deposit and non-deposit leverage (market values) 
  Non-deposit (market) Deposit (market) 
M/B 0.744
***
 2.55 -0.085 -0.24 -0.586
*
 -1.74 0.180 0.45 
ROAA -1.805
*
 -1.83 0.229 0.61 0.613 0.48 -0.257 -0.55 
Log(size) 0.033
***
 5.28 0.026
***
 4.13 -0.037
***
 -5.87 -0.037
***
 -5.81 
Collateral 0.051 0.69 0.027 0.44 0.006 0.08 -0.017 -0.26 
Risk -0.006 -0.42 0.001 0.09 0.010 0.73 -0.009 -0.85 
Tierone -0.131 -0.53 -0.509
**
 -2.00 0.096 0.35 0.579
**
 2.03 
Developed 0.014 0.53 -0.060 -1.25 -0.028 -1.07 0.064 1.38 
Inflation 0.000 0.00 0.377 0.86 -0.081 -0.34 -0.761
**
 -1.96 
Corruption index -0.582
***
 -3.91 -0.731
***
 -4.83 0.703
***
 4.44 0.885
***
 5.79 
Creditor rights 0.012 0.98 0.033
*
 1.74 -0.007 -0.50 -0.024 -1.38 
Bankruptcy code -0.070
**
 -2.56 -0.101
**
 -2.22 0.083
***
 2.97 0.112
***
 2.72 
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Miller tax 0.074* 1.84 0.124
**
 1.97 0.032 0.70 0.156
**
 2.32 
Common law 0.031 1.11 -0.031 -1.38 -0.058
*
 -1.79 0.037 1.59 
Deposit 
insurance 0.149
***
 5.67 0.080 1.63 -0.159
***
 -5.08 -0.071 -1.33 
GDP growth -0.282
***
 -2.78 -0.437 -1.18 0.292
***
 2.67 0.640
*
 1.69 
Log listed 
companies -0.099
***
 -3.31 -0.064 -1.26 0.092
***
 2.92 0.058 1.22 
Log (GDS bil) 0.093
***
 3.51 0.060
**
 1.96 -0.100
***
 -3.43 -0.063
**
 -2.17 
Public bond/GDP -0.136
***
 -6.94 -0.158
***
 -6.42 0.156
***
 7.39 0.193
***
 7.39 
Cons -0.956
***
 -3.15 0.097 0.28 1.851
***
 5.32 0.898
**
 2.40 
Adj R
2
   0.645   0.659   0.670   0.736 
N   2082   2943   2082   2943 
Panel C: Dependent variable-Deposit and non-deposit leverage (book values) 
 
Non-deposit (book) Deposit (book) 
M/B 0.632
**
 2.03 -0.121 -0.31 0.082 0.27 0.813
**
 2.12 
ROAA -0.770 -0.67 0.116 0.26 0.532 0.46 -0.316 -0.70 
Log(size) 0.036
***
 6.14 0.037
***
 6.04 -0.034
***
 -5.86 -0.035
***
 -5.85 
Collateral 0.007 0.10 0.029 0.46 0.015 0.21 -0.015 -0.24 
Risk -0.009 -0.70 0.007 0.73 0.009 0.67 -0.008 -0.76 
Tierone -0.174 -0.71 -0.654
**
 -2.38 -0.041 -0.17 0.463
*
 1.69 
Developed 0.023 0.95 -0.062 -1.42 -0.023 -0.97 0.056 1.30 
Inflation 0.048 0.22 0.695
*
 1.91 -0.011 -0.05 -0.740
**
 -2.00 
Corruption index -0.681
***
 -4.64 -0.815
***
 -5.60 0.665
***
 4.48 0.803
***
 5.42 
Creditor rights 0.008 0.64 0.024 1.47 -0.007 -0.58 -0.023 -1.39 
Bankruptcy code -0.076
***
 -2.86 -0.105
***
 -2.70 0.079
***
 3.01 0.102
***
 2.64 
Miller tax -0.017 -0.40 -0.157
**
 -2.50 0.026 0.49 0.156
**
 2.14 
Common law 0.047 1.58 -0.035 -1.58 -0.053
*
 -1.78 0.031 1.37 
Deposit insurance 0.155
***
 5.27 0.074 1.47 -0.155
***
 -5.31 -0.072 -1.45 
GDP growth -0.257
***
 -2.58 -0.600
*
 -1.68 0.298
***
 2.88 0.573 1.60 
Log listed 
companies -0.084
***
 -2.82 -0.052 -1.14 0.085
***
 2.88 0.058 1.32 
Log (GDS bil) 0.090
***
 3.33 0.054
**
 1.98 -0.092
***
 -3.38 -0.060
**
 -2.18 
Public bond/GDP -0.148
***
 -7.48 -0.178
***
 -7.18 0.149
***
 7.59 0.177
***
 7.16 
Cons -0.896
***
 -2.79 0.011 0.03 1.151
***
 3.63 0.270 0.75 
Adj R
2
   0.683   0.737   0.672   0.740 
N   2082   2943   2082   2943 
The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 
2012: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 == 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1 + 𝜇 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ Ω𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
In columns two and six, we report the results for the crisis period, while the results are reported without the crisis 
period in columns four and eight. In Panel A, the dependent variable is market leverage in columns two and four, 
and book leverage in columns six and eight. In Panel B, the dependent variable is market values of non-deposit 
54 
 
liabilities in columns two and four, and book values of deposit liabilities in columns six and eight. In Panel C, the 
dependent variable is book values of non-deposit liabilities in columns two and four, and book values of deposit 
liabilities in columns six and eight. The explanatory variables include both bank- and country-level variables. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 2009).∗∗∗,∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 
1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 12: Determinants of Leverage and Funding Sources Using Different sub-Samples 
 
EU Developed 
Basel I  
(1998-2004) EU Developed 
Basel I  
(1998-2004) 
Panel A: Dependent variable-Market and book leverage 
 Market Leverage Book Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
M/B 0.562*** 0.780*** 1.631*** 0.652*** 0.700*** 0.659*** 
 (5.45) (8.06) (6.37) (37.66) (46.46) (23.93) 
ROAA -3.301*** -4.001*** -2.230*** -0.580*** -0.601*** -0.396*** 
 (-3.03) (-7.23) (-5.26) (-5.23) (-6.43) (-3.89) 
Log(size) 0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (1.00) (0.67) (-1.45) (5.99) (6.23) (4.65) 
Collateral 0.106*** 0.058** 0.247*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.013** 
 (5.46) (3.08) (6.19) (7.21) (8.34) (2.97) 
Dividends -0.030** -0.024*** -0.094*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (-2.94) (-2.62) (-3.25) (0.87) (-0.81) (0.10) 
Risk 0.008 0.016** 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.60) (3.22) (0.36) (-0.82) (-0.26) (-0.28) 
Tier one -0.185* -0.349*** -0.307 -0.237*** -0.250*** -0.198*** 
 (-2.14) (-4.08) (-1.81) (-15.84) (-18.41) (-10.53) 
Developed   0.008   -0.002 
   -0.33   (-0.81) 
Inflation 0.654*** -0.777*** -0.085 0.077** -0.007 -0.089*** 
 (3.38) (-6.45) (-0.40) (2.27) (-0.37) (-4.20) 
Corruption index 0.245** 0.001 -0.254* -0.043** -0.054*** -0.018 
 (2.77) (0.02) (-2.33) (-2.79) (-4.78) (-1.50) 
Creditor rights 0.003 0.006 0.029*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.82) (1.63) (2.96) (2.63) (1.57) (2.15) 
Bankruptcy code 0.046*** 0.023*** 0.125*** 0.002 0.004*** -0.003 
 (5.38) (3.74) (8.48) (1.46) (4.44) (-1.63) 
Miller tax 0.174*** -0.019 0.157 0.014** 0.022*** 0.046*** 
 (4.27) (-0.66) (1.38) (2.11) (5.02) (3.81) 
Common law -0.101*** -0.028*** -0.067*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.004*** 
 (-10.71) (-3.87) (-4.36) (-10.72) (-10.96) (-2.81) 
Deposit insurance -0.048*** 0.001 -0.008 -0.005** -0.002 -0.002 
 (-3.31) (0.09) (-0.33) (-2.00) (-1.44) (-0.69) 
GDP growth -0.348*** -0.379*** 0.402* -0.006 0.026* -0.081*** 
 (-3.74) (-4.39) -1.91 (-0.35) -1.85 (-3.39) 
crisis 0.058*** 0.064***  0.003** 0.003***  
 (12.53) (13.74)  (3.24) (3.91)  
Log listed 
companies 0.132*** 0.021* 0.106** 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.014** 
 (3.97) (1.80) (2.16) (6.10) (3.65) (2.50) 
Log (GDS bil) 0.113*** 0.071*** 0.098* 0.011*** 0.002 0.016*** 
 (3.13) (3.12) (1.88) (3.88) (1.07) (2.70) 
Public bond/GDP 0.051*** 0.007 0.049** 0.005*** 0.001 0.001 
 6.77 (0.97) (2.47) (3.92) (1.22) (0.17) 
constant 0.297*** 0.166 -0.688*** 0.318*** 0.280*** 0.323*** 
 (2.65) (1.62) (-2.70) (16.98) (17.67) (11.63) 
       
Adj R
2
 0.485 0.44 0.674 0.866 0.884 0.897 
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N 2465 3500 2429 2465 3500 2429 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable-Deposit and non-deposit leverage 
 Non-deposit Non-deposit Non-deposit Deposit Deposit  Deposit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
M/B 0.491*** 0.344** -0.424* -0.485*** -0.339** 0.424* 
 (3.44) (2.26) (-1.87) (-3.46) (-2.25) (1.87) 
ROAA 2.063*** 1.369*** 0.298 -2.090*** -1.400*** -0.298 
 (4.88) (3.25) (0.76) (-5.03) (-3.35) (-0.76) 
Log(size) 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.030*** -0.031*** -0.042*** -0.030*** 
 (11.40) (15.42) (9.77) (-11.60) (-15.56) (-9.77) 
Collateral 0.097*** -0.003 0.096*** -0.104*** -0.002 -0.096** 
 (3.41) (-0.11) (2.59) (-3.71) (-0.06) (-2.59) 
Risk 0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.84) (0.09) (-0.47) (-0.87) (-0.12) (0.47) 
Tier one -0.091 -0.008 -0.372** 0.124 0.037 0.372** 
 (-0.75) (-0.06) (-2.44) (1.04) (0.28) (2.44) 
Developed   -0.222***   0.222*** 
   (-5.31)   (5.31) 
Inflation 1.414*** 1.370*** 2.225*** -1.404*** -1.362*** -2.225*** 
 (4.80) (5.48) (8.05) (-4.85) (-5.50) (-8.05) 
Corruption 
index -0.235 -0.257** -1.177*** 0.247 0.257** 1.177*** 
 (-1.40) (-2.19) (-9.04) (1.50) (2.21) (9.04) 
Creditor rights 0.002 0.015*** 0.070*** -0.002 -0.016*** -0.070*** 
 (0.26) (2.77) (6.92) (-0.26) (-2.85) (-6.92) 
Bankruptcy 
code -0.021 -0.079*** -0.106*** 0.021 0.079*** 0.106*** 
 (-1.66) (-7.00) (-5.85) (1.64) (7.06) (5.85) 
Miller tax 0.450*** 0.473*** -0.402*** -0.443*** -0.471*** 0.402*** 
 (3.82) (6.22) (-2.90) (-3.82) (-6.26) (2.90) 
Common law 0.177*** 0.008 0.083*** -0.175*** -0.008 -0.083*** 
 (7.71) (0.53) (3.92) (-7.75) (-0.48) (-3.92) 
Deposit 
insurance 0.117*** 0.148*** 0.256*** -0.117*** -0.148*** -0.256*** 
 (2.69) (4.64) (4.00) (-2.72) (-4.70) (-4.00) 
GDP growth 0.01 0.01 -0.375 -0.004 -0.006 0.375 
 (0.10) (0.08) (-1.45) (-0.04) (-0.05) (1.45) 
crisis 0.033*** 0.082***  -0.033*** -0.082***  
 (4.09) (11.16)  (-4.13) (-11.26)  
Log listed 
companies -0.437*** -0.112*** -0.301*** 0.436*** 0.112*** 0.301*** 
 (-13.29) (-8.06) (-6.81) (13.48) (8.12) (6.81) 
Log (GDS bil) 0.166*** 0.045** 0.291*** -0.165*** -0.044** -0.291*** 
 (5.55) (2.32) (7.05) (-5.62) (-2.30) (-7.05) 
Public 
bond/GDP -0.01 -0.125*** -0.044** 0.011 0.124*** 0.044** 
 (-0.85) (-15.75) (-2.54) (0.89) (15.89) (2.54) 
constant -0.113 -0.766*** 0.354 1.104*** 1.759*** 0.646** 
 (-0.68) (-4.77) (1.37) (6.81) (11.07) (2.50) 
Adj R
2
 0.782 0.719 0.753 0.787 0.723 0.753 
N 2465 3500 2429 2465 3500 2429 
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The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 
2012: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 == 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗.𝑡−1 + 𝜇 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ Ω𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
In columns two and five, we report the results for the European banks. The results for banks in developed countries 
are reported in columns three and six. Columns four and seven report the results for Basel 1 (1998-2004). In Panel 
A, the dependent variable is market leverage in Models 1-3, and book leverage in Models 4-6. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is market values of non-deposit liabilities in Models 1-3, and book values of deposit liabilities 
Models 4-6. The explanatory variables include both bank- and country-level variables which are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
of errors (Petersen, 2009).∗∗∗,∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1. This figure plots the Tier one capital ratio as risk weighted assets across 57 countries over 1998-2012 
period. 
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Figure 2: Median Book Leverage of Sample Banks (1998-2012) 
This figure plots the median book leverage ratio across 57 countries. The book leverage ratio is measured as 1-(book 
value of equity/ book value of assets).   
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Figure 3: Median Market Leverage of Sample Banks (1998-2012) 
This figure plots the median market leverage ratio across 57 countries. The market leverage ratio is measured as 1-
(market value of equity (= number of shares*end of year stock price)/ market value of bank (= market value of 
equity+ book value of liabilities)).  
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Appendix 1: Definition of Variables  
Variable  Description  Source 
Book leverage 1- (book value of equity / book value of assets) Bankscope 
Market leverage 1- (Market value of equity (=number of shares * 
end of year stock price) / market value of bank 
(=market value of equity + book value of 
liabilities)) 
Bankscope 
Log (size) Book value of total assets Bankscope 
Collateral (Total securities+treasury bills+other 
bills+bonds+CDs+cash and due from banks+land 
and buildings+other tangible assets)/book value 
of assets 
Bankscope 
ROAA Net Income / book value of average assets Bankscope 
M/B Market value of assets / book value of assets Bankscope 
  (total securities + treasury bills + other bills + 
bonds + CDs + cash and due from  
banks + land and buildings + other tangible 
assets) / book value of assets  
Bankscope 
Dividends Dummy equal to one if the bank pays a dividend 
in a given year 
Bankscope 
Risk  Annualised standard deviation of daily  
national stock market index return*( market 
value of equity/market value of bank) 
 
Deposits (Book) Total deposits / book value of assets Bankscope 
Deposits (Market) Total deposits / market value of asset (see above) Bankscope 
Non-deposit liabilities (Book) Book leverage – deposits (Book) Bankscope 
Non-deposit liabilities (Market) Market leverage – deposits (Market) Bankscope 
GDP growth Annual percentage change of gross domestic 
product 
World Development  
Indicators, World Bank 
Inflation Annual percentage change in average consumer 
price index 
Economic and Social 
Data Service, 
International Financial 
Statistics 
Tier one  Regulatory Tier 1 calculated as Tier 1 capital 
divided by risk weighted assets 
Bankscope 
Deposit insurance Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank deposits are 
insured by government. 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2005) 
Bankruptcy code A proxy for the existence of an explicit 
bankruptcy code, measured as a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if an insolvent firm is most likely to 
undergo a reorganization proceeding 
Djankov et al. (2008)  
Public bond/GDP 
 
 World Development  
Indicators, World Bank, 
Financial Development 
and Structure Dataset 
Miller tax  Estimate of the miller tax ratio equal to (1 - 
[(after tax value of dividends)/( after tax value of 
interest)]) calculated using statutory tax rates 
OECD tax database, 
Price Waterhouse 
Coopers,  
Doing Business, Ernst 
Young  
Classical tax dummy equal to one if the bank is located in the 
classical tax system 
OECD tax database, 
Price Waterhouse 
Coopers,  
Doing Business, Ernst 
Young 
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Crisis Dummy equals 1 if t=2007-2010, zero otherwise  
Log listed companies Logarithm of acountry’s number of listed 
companies 
 
Log (GDS bil) Logarithm of  a country’s domestic savings  
Creditor rights 
 
Creditor rights index Djankov et al. (2007)  
Corruption  index An index ranges from 0 to 10, with larger value 
indicating more severe corruption 
 
Corruption Perception  
Index, Transparency  
International 
Developed  Dummy equal to one if a country is classified as 
developed according to the World Bank 
classification based on countries’ gross national 
income level 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Common law Dummy equal to one if a country adopts the 
common law system  
Treisman (2002) and 
Djankov et al. (2007)   
This table provides definitions and data sources of variables. We follow Gropp and Heider (2010) and Fan et al. 
(2012) in our definition of variables. 
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Appendix 2: Time and Country Fixed Effects  
 
Market Leverage Book Leverage 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
M/B 0.613
***
 0.212 0.884
***
 0.607
***
 0.881
***
 0.774
***
 0.870
***
 0.771
***
 
t 4.23 0.91 6.02 2.71 41.41 28.81 40.91 27.37 
ROAA -5.032
***
 -3.425
***
 -5.869
***
 -3.508
***
 -0.165*
*
 0.126 -0.230
***
 0.039 
t -7.76 -5.12 -8.68 -5.14 -2.11 1.35 -2.86 0.40 
log(size) 0.013
***
 0.011
***
 0.003 -0.002 0.001
***
 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 
t 4.54 3.25 1.10 -0.72 5.79 3.97 5.64 4.29 
Collateral 0.087
***
 0.046 0.047
*
 0.063
*
 0.002 0.011
**
 0.001 0.009
**
 
t 3.07 1.27 1.75 1.87 0.61 2.49 0.43 2.23 
Dividends 0.007 -0.024
**
 -0.032
***
 -0.003 -0.003
*
 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
t 0.65 -2.31 -3.05 -0.35 -1.70 -0.82 1.31 -0.78 
Risk 0.021
***
 0.001 0.028
***
 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
t 2.88 0.25 4.56 1.49 -0.90 -1.28 -0.26 -0.65 
Constant 0.149 0.552
**
 -0.033 0.336 0.085
***
 0.188
***
 0.092
***
 0.188
***
 
t 1.01 2.32 -0.23 1.52 4.23 7.33 4.68 7.11 
N 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 
Adj R
2
 0.39 0.56 0.52 0.66 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.88 
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Country Fixed effects No yes No Yes No yes No Yes 
The table shows the results of estimating the following regression for 347 banks across 57 countries from 1998 to 2012: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿log (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃Collaterali,j,t−1 + 𝜗𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑗.𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑗 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The dependent variable is market leverage in Models 1-4 and book leverage in Models 5-8. The explanatory variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B), return 
on average assets (ROAA), the log of total assets (Size), collateral (Collateral) and a dummy for dividend paying banks (Div) for bank i in country j in year t (see 
Appendix1 for the definition of variables). All these variables are lagged by one year except dividend dummy. Time (ct) and country (cj) fixed effects and are 
included in the regression to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and across time that might be correlated with the independent variables. 
Following Petersen (2009), we employ cluster adjusted standard errors at the bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ 
and ∗denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
